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Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.: Apportioning the 
Fault of Immune Employers 
The right of an employee injured at work to receive 
workers' compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' Com- 
pensation Act1 represents a compromise between employees 
and  employer^.^ The employee receives a predictable, though 
somewhat limited, recovery from the employer without the 
costly and time-consuming process of litigation ordinarily re- 
quired to establish the employer's negligence: while maintain- 
ing the right to bring suit against negligent third-partied The 
employer, in exchange for providing the insurance or benefits: 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. $5 35-1-1 to -107 (1988) (text of the Workers' Compen- 
sation Act). 
2. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 P.2d 591, 595 
(Utah 1944); RAY J. DAVIS, UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 1-15 (1988); see 
also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 
1983) (employees and employers have rights and obligations under the Workers' 
Compensation Act). 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 35-1-45 (1988) (injured employees "shall be paid com- 
pensation"); see FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TOWS $ 11.2 at  70, 75 
(2d ed. 1986) (liability not based on fault; workers' compensation reduces court pro- 
ceedings); 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.10 (1993) 
(liability not based on negligence of employer or innocence of employee); Note, 
Utah's Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 
573, 575 [hereinafter Utah's Workers' Compensation] (Workers' Compensation Act 
helps avoid "expensive and time-consuming" litigation); see also Baker v. Wycoff, 79 
P.2d 77, 85 (Utah 1938) (liability does not depend on the negligence of the employ- 
er); Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (proof of 
fault not required in workers' compensation cases); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 
758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (workers' compensation system "excludes 
consideration of faultw). 
4. Concerning the right of an employee to sue third-parties, the Workers' 
Compensation Act provides the following: 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under 
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a per- 
son other than an employer . . . the injured employee . . . may claim 
compensation and the injured employee . . . may also have an action for 
damages against such third person. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988). 
5. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer has three options for 
securing workers' compensation benefits for its employees: (1) "by insuring . . . 
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah"; (2) "by insuring . . . with any 
stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of 
workers' compensation insurance in [Utah]"; or (3) "by furnishing annually t o  the 
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is guaranteed immunity from suit by the employee6 and the 
right to reimbursement for any benefits paid to the employee if 
the employee recovers from third-parties.' This balancing of 
interests requires both employees and employers to  give and 
take? 
In comparison with the Workers' Compensation Act, the 
Utah Liability Reform Act provides the method for determining 
and apportioning the fault of plaintiffs, defendants, and other 
parties in an action for personal in j~ r i es .~  In essence, the Act 
provides that no person will be liable for more than his or her 
proportional share of fault.'' 
commission satisfadory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation in the 
amount . . . provided for in this title." UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-46 (1988). 
6. Id. $ 35-1-60. This section of the Workers' Compensation Act provides 
that the compensation received by the employee "shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer . . . [and] shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, . . . and no action at  law may be maintained against an employer . . . 
based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee." This is known as the 
"exclusive remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Dahl v. Kerbs 
Constr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1993) (employer immune from suit by em- 
ployee); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1989) (employer 
shielded by "exclusive remedy immunity" conferred by the Workers' Compensation 
Act); Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981) (workers' compen- 
sation is "exclusive vehicle for recovery"). 
7. With respect to the employer's reimbursement right, the Workers' Com- 
pensation Act provides the following: 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be dis- 
bursed as follows: . . . (2) The person liable for compensation payments 
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 35-1-62 (1988). 
8. See DAVIS, supra note 2, a t  1-16 (employers and employees each have 
benefits and burdens under workers' compensation); Utah's Workers' Compensation, 
supra note 3, a t  573-74 (employers and employees give up rights in exchange for 
benefits); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 
1190 (Utah 1983) (employees and employers each have "rights and obligations"); 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petition 
for Rehearing at  app. 12, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993) 
(No. 910482) (workers' compensation is a "careful balancing" of rights). 
9. UTAH CODE ANN. 5s 78-27-37 to -43 (1992) (text of the Liability Reform - 
Act). 
10. Sections 78-27-38 to 78-27-40 are the key sections of the Liability Reform 
Act. Section 78-27-38 defines "comparative negligence": 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by 
that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any per- 
son seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault 
attributable to  that defendant. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-27-38 (1992). 
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In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.," the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted the Liability Reform Act in the context of an 
employee/third-party suit in which an employee had been in- 
jured a t  work as a result of the negligence of his employer and 
other third-parties." The court concluded that the Liability 
Reform Act allowed the fault of the employer to be determined 
and apportioned, despite the employer's immunity under the 
Workers' Compensation Act.13 To some, the court's decision 
disrupted the underlying principles of the Workers' Compensa- 
tion A d  by including the employer in  the apportionment pro- 
cess and thereby limiting the recovery an  employee will receive 
from third-parties. l4 
This Note examines the Utah Supreme Court's decision in  
Sullivan. Part I1 provides the background for the court's deci- 
sion by briefly summarizing the development of comparative 
negligence in Utah in the context of the Workers' Compensa- 
tion Act. Part I11 states the facts of the Sullivan case and pres- 
ents the reasoning behind the court's decision. Part IV analyzes 
Sullivan in light of the plain language and legislative history of 
the Liability Reform Act. Finally, this Note concludes that the 
court misinterpreted the legislative intent of the Liability Re- 
form Act and proposes a legislative solution to resolve the ineq- 
uities resulting from the Sullivan decision. 
Section 78-27-39 contains the mechanism for determining and apportioning 
fault: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct 
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total 
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
Id. 8 78-27-39. 
Section 78-27-40 provides the following: 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defen- 
dant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution 
from any other person. 
Id. 3 78-27-40. 
11. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
12. See id. at 878. 
13. Id. at 884; see infra text accompanying note 43. 
14. See Srcllivan, 853 P.2d at  885 (Stewart, J., dissenting); GOVERNOR'S TASK 
FORCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION, FINAL REPORT 18-19 (1993) [hereinafter 
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE]; Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 8, Sullivan (No. 910482); see infra 
note 111. 
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In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the Liability Reform 
Act which modified the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973.15 
The Liability Reform Act dispensed with joint and several lia- 
bility under the Comparative Negligence Act, but left intact the 
doctrine of comparative negligence. l6 
Prior to the Liability Reform Act, when an employee was 
injured a t  work as a result of the negligence of both the em- 
ployer and a third party, the employer was not liable under 
joint and several liability for contribution to a third-party tort- 
feasor because the employers' 'liability to the employee sprang 
from the Workmen's Compensation Act and not from tort 
law."" Therefore, since the employer was not liable for contri- 
bution based on joint and several liability, the third party "bore 
the risk of paying not only his or her share of the  plaintiff"^ 
damages, but also the shares of [the employer and] other tort- 
feasors who were impecunious or immune from s~it." '~ 
The issue presented the court in Sullivan was whether 
under the Liability Reform Act the fault of immune employers 
should be determined and included in  the apportionment pro- 
cess. To answer this question, the court analyzed the plain 
language and legislative history of the Act, and in addition 
15. 1986 Utah Laws 199; Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
For a general discussion of the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973, see E. Wayne 
Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of 
a Release-A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 406. 
16. 1986 Utah Laws 199; Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
see also Brad C. Betebenner, Comment, The Liability Reform Act: An  Approach to 
Equitable Application, 1987 J. CONTEMP. L. 89, 91-97 (noting the effect of the abol- 
ishment of joint and several liability). The Liability Reform Act states that a 
plaintiff can "recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault ex- 
ceeds his own." UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-27-38 (1992). 
17. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 369 (Utah 1990) (an 
employer is "not liable for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor"); see also Shell 
Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1983) 
(employer cannot be joint tort-feasor); Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153, 
154 (Utah 1980) (employer cannot be joint tort-feasor); Curtis v. Harmon Elec., 
Inc., 552 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1976) (employer cannot be a joint tort-feasor). 
18. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  882; see Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 F. Supp. 
268, 274 n.9 @. Utah 1987) ("[Als a matter of law, [the third party] is the sole 
cause of liability' that could be paid to the plaintiff."); Freund, 793 P.2d at 369 (an 
employer is "not liable for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor"); Thode, supra 
note 15, at  419 & n.42 (defendant third party liable for non-parties); HENRY 
WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 13:13, at 272-73 & n.1 (2d ed. 1987) (employer not 
subject to contribution). 
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considered the equities of apportionment and how other juris- 
dictions apportion fault in employeelthird-party actions.lg 
111. SULLNAN v. SCOULAR G AIN Co. 
A. The Facts 
In October 1986, Scoular Grain Co., Freeport Center Asso- 
ciates, and Scoular Grain Co. of Utah (collectively "Scoular") 
employed Kenneth Sullivan to work at the Freeport Center in 
Clearfield, Utah.20 The Freeport Center is a commercial grain 
storage facility comprising several rows of warehouses connect- 
ed by railroad tracks2' At the Freeport Center, the Scoular 
employees are responsible for unloading the grain into the 
warehouses after its delivery by ra i l r~ad. '~  
On October 17, 1986, Sullivan was monitoring the unload- 
ing of grain from a railroad car while standing between two 
empty cars.23 Unknown to Sullivan, other loaded cars were 
being pushed down the track towards these empty cars?* 
When the cars crashed into one another, Sullivan was knocked 
to the ground and run over.25 As a result of the accident, 
Sullivan lost his left arm and left leg? 
In 1987, Sullivan filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah (the "trial court") against 
Scoular, Union Pacific Railroad, Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, Oregon Short Line Railroad, Utah Power & Light Co., 
Trackmobile, Inc., and G.W. Van Keppel CO.~' alleging negli- 
gence; failure to train, instruct and warn; strict products liabili- 
ty and other causes of action.28 In 1989, the trial court dis- 
missed Scoular as a defendant after finding it immune from 
plaintiff's claim under the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Workers' Compensation Act.2g The trial court also dismissed 













Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-84. 
Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 3-5, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
Id. at 4. 
Id. at 5. 
Id. at 7. 
Id. 
Id. at 7-8. 
Id. at 8; Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993). 
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878. 
Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 5-6, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878. See supra note 6 for the text of the "exclusive 
provision. 
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legal duty to S~l l ivan.~ '  Thereafter, defendant Trackmobile 
moved to have the jury determine and apportion the fault of all 
originally named defendants, including Sco~lar .~ '  
The trial court found no Utah law controlling the allocation 
of fault of an immune employer,s2 and therefore certified the 
following question to the Utah Supreme Court:33 
Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Annot. 
$ 78-27-38, et seq., can a jury apportion the fault of the 
plaintiff's employers that caused or contributed to the acci- 
dent although said employers are immune fiom suit under 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. $ 35-1-60, 
et seq?' 
The Utah Supreme Court accepted the certification and con- 
cluded that a jury may determine and apportion the fault of 
employers despite their immunity from liability under the 
Workers' Compensation 
B. The Reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court 
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis of whether the 
fault of a n  immune employer may be determined and appor- 
tioned in an employee/third-party suit by noting an ambiguity 
30. Sulliuan, 853 P.2d at  878. 
31. Id. at 879. 
32. Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 3, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
33. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits a court of the 
United States to certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court. The relevant por- 
tion of rule 41 provides the following: 
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO ANSWER QUESTIONS OF LAW. The Utah Supreme 
Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the 
United States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in 
accordance with the provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah 
applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 41. 
34. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  878. As the court noted, the correct name for what 
the district court entitled the "Utah Comparative Fault Act" is the "Liability Re- 
form Act." Id. at  878 n.1; 1986 Utah Laws 199. 
35. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 884. In addition to the question concerning immune 
employers, the court also accepted certification of a question outside the scope of 
this Note. That question asked whether "[ulnder the Utah Comparative Fault Act, 
Utah Code Ann. 5 78-27-38, et seq., can a jury apportion the fault of an individual 
or entity that has been dismissed from the litigation but against whom it is 
claimed that they have caused or contributed to the accident." Id. at  878. The 
court concluded that "[a] jury may not apportion the fault of a party that has been 
dismissed from the lawsuit pursuant to an adjudication on the merits of the liabili- 
ty issue." Id. at  884. 
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in the Liability Reform Act caused by the Workers9 Compensa- 
tion The court found that because of the "exclusive 
remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act:' the 
Liability Reform Act's definition of "defendant"38 seemed to  
define "defendant" in such "a way that appear[ed] to  preclude 
inclusion of an employer from app~rtionment."~~ However, the 
court noted that sections 78-27-38 and 78-27-40 of the Liability 
Reform Act seemed t o  indicate that the employer's fault should 
be included in the apportionment process.40 
Since one section of the Liability Reform Act seemed to  
preclude inclusion of the employer's fault from apportionment, 
while other sections of the Act seemed to require it, the court 
concluded that it was "faced with two arguably contradictory 
statutes within the same article."41 Thus, an ambiguity exist- 
ed requiring "the court to make a policy inference as to  the 
overall purpose and intent of the Act."42 
The court concluded that the purpose and intent of the 
Liability Reform Act was to  include immune employers in the 
apportionment process so that the remaining defendants were 
not liable in "excess of their proportion of fault.''43 In support 
of this conclusion, the court analyzed the legislative history of 
the Liability Reform Act and concluded that one of its main 
purposes was to abolish joint and several liability.44 The court 
reasoned that if the immune employer is not included in the 
apportionment process "one of the major evils of joint and sev- 
eral liability would result" since third-parties would be liable 
for the fault of the immune employer.45 In addition, the court 
found that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Com- 
pensation Act "does not bar the [employer] from the apportion- 
36. Id. at 879-80. 
37. Id. at 879; see supm note 6 .  
38. Defendant is defrned as "any person not immune from suit who is claimed 
to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." UTAH CODE ANN. 
8 78-27-37(1) (1992). 
39. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880. 
40. Id. at 879-80. See supra note 10 for the text of sections 78-27-38 and 78- 
27-40. 
41. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.; see infro, notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
45. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880. 
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ment process because apportionment is not an action at law 
and would not impose any civil liability on the [employer]."46 
The court also noted three reasons why including the em- 
ployer in the apportionment process would not prejudice the 
employer. First, the court reasoned that the employer has "a 
fmancial interest in the outcome of the [employeelthird-party] 
action.'"" This interest arises because of the reimbursement 
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act which provides 
that the person liable48 for compensation shall be reimbursed 
"for all payments made" if the employee recovers from a third 
party.49 
Second, the Workers' Compensation Act provides that the 
employer or  its insurer "shall" receive notice and have a rea- 
sonable opportunity to appear in an employeelthird-party ac- 
tioa50 
Third, under section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Act, a 
jury may determine and apportion the fault of a "person seek- 
ing recovery."' A "person seeking recovery" is defined as "any 
person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, 
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
repre~entative."~~ The court reasoned that because of the re- 
46. Id. at 881. 
47. Id. 
48. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer has three options for 
securing workers' compensation benefits for its employees: (1) "by insuring . . . 
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utahn; (2) "by insuring . . . with any 
stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of 
workers' compensation insurance in [Utah]"; or (3) "by furnishing annually to the 
commission satisfactory proof of fmancial ability to pay direct compensation in the 
amount . . . provided for in this title." UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-46 (1988). There- 
fore, it is possible that the employer's insurer, and not the employer, will have 
paid the workers' compensation benefits and hence the insurer, and not the em- 
ployer, will have the financial interest. 
49. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62(2) (1988); see supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
50. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881. The relevant portion of section 35-1-62 of 
the Utah Code provides the following: 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in the 
case of death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the 
carrier or other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order 
to give such person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in 
the proceeding. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988). 
51. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881. See infra note 79 and accompanying text for 
full text of section 78-27-39. 
52. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-27-37(3) (1992). 
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imbursement provision of the Workers' Compensation 
the employer or its insurer "may be legitimately viewed as 
persons seeking recovery under the 
In addition, the court looked to other jurisdictions and at  
the competing equitable interests of the parties to find support 
for its decision.55 The court found that although "somewhat 
different statutes" were invol~ed;~ other states in the Pacifi 
Reporter generally apportioned the fault of immune employ- 
e r ~ . ~ '  The court also noted that the Liability Reform Act had 
shifted the risk caused by "immune tort-feasors to the plaintiffs 
by abolishing joint and several liability."58 Additionally, under 
general comparative negligence theory, the court found "it is 
accepted practice for the jury to apportion the comparative 
fault of all tortfeasors," including immune employers .59 Ac- 
cordingly, the court concluded that the "plaintifYs remedy on 
this point is a legislative one."' 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This case presented the court a complex set of statutory 
interpretation problems requiring a determination of how the 
legislature intended to apportion fault "when one of the parties 
whose negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injuries is im- 
mune f'rom liability.'*' The problem this issue presented can 
be illustrated in the following hypothetical. 
53. Id. 8 35-1-62; see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
54. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t  881. 
55. Id. at 881-83. 
56. Id. at 881. 
57. In summarizing the apportionment rules of the various states in the Pa- 
cifw Reporter, the court grouped the states into four categories: first, states that 
have expressly adopted the practice of apportioning the fault of immune employers 
(Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Washington); second, states that have 
interpreted their "general comparative negligence statutes to require apportionment 
of nonparty fault* (California, Hawaii, Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming); third, 
states which "retain joint and several liability but allow the consideration of non- 
party negligence for the limited purpose of determining whether all or none of the 
total fault can be attributed to the nonparty" (Alaska and Montana); and fourth, 
states which "refuse to allow a jury to consider the fault of nonparties in appor- 
tionment* (Nevada and Oregon). Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881, app. 884-85 (Citations 
to the state codes are in the Appendix.). 
58. Id. at 882; see Be tebe~er ,  supra note 16, at 94, 96. 
59. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t  882-83. 
60. Id. at 883. 
61. Id. at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
196 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
A. Hypothetical 
Assume an employee is injured at work because of the 
negligence of the employer and a third party. A jury would find 
that the employer is sixty percent at fault," and the third 
party is forty percent at fault. The jury would also find that the 
employee, who was without fault, sustained $1,000,000 in dam- 
ages. 
The employee's exclusive remedy against the employer is 
determined by the Workers' Compensation Act." Therefore, 
the employee will receive from the employer or its insurerG4 a 
statutorily determined amount of compensation based on the 
severity of the Assume that under the Workers' Com- 
pensation Act, the employee is entitled to  $300,000 in compen- 
sation." The employee then sues the third party. 
At trial, the third party requests that the fault of the em- 
ployer be determined and included in the apportionment pro- 
~es s .~ '  Assuming the court denies the request, the third party 
62. In this hypothetical and in the hypothetical appearing later in the Note, 
the employee is without fault. See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text. 
While a completely faultless employee is unlikely, an i ~ o c e n t  employee best il- 
lustrates the principles involved in this case and the impact of the court's decision 
on the employee's recovery. 
63. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 35-1-60 (1988); see supra note 6. 
64. See supra note 48. 
65. Utah's WorkersJ Compensation, supra note 3, at 606-614. Sections 35-1-64 
to 35-1-81 of the Workers' Compensation Act set forth the amount of compensation 
received by an employee for an injury and the manner of its distribution. While 
the statutory amount of compensation provides some financial support for the in- 
jured employee, the amount of compensation received typically represents only a 
fraction of the employee's previous salary. For example, section 35-1-67 provides 
the compensation level for a permanent total disability. In part the section pro- 
vides: 
For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312- 
week entitlement, compensation shall be 66 213% of the employee's aver- 
age weekly wage at  the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at  the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of 
$45 per week, plus $5 for a dependant spouse, plus $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent minor children . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-67(2) (1988). For more on the monetary inadequacies of 
workers' compensation, see HARPER, supra note 3, at 78-79. 
66. As of December 1990, Sullivan had received over $275,000 in workers' 
compensation benefits as a result of his accident. Reply Brief of Certified Respon- 
dent K e ~ e t h  Sullivan at  7, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
67. In this hypothetical and in similar hypotheticals used by the majority and 
the dissent in Sullivan, the assumption is that regardless of the number of plain- 
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will be liable for $1,000,000, rather than its actual proportional 
fault share of $400,000.~~ Therefore, the employee will receive 
$300,000 of workers' compensation and $1,000,000 from the 
third party for a total of $1,300,000. However, the $1,000,000 
received by the employee from the third party is subject to the 
reimbursement right of the employer or  its insurersg who has 
paid $300,000 to the employee.70 The net result is the employ- 
ee receives $1,000,000, all of which has been paid by the third 
party which was responsible for only forty percent of the 
fault. 
However, if the employer's fault is included in the appor- 
tionment process, the third party will be liable for $400,000 
since the third party is only forty percent at fault." Therefore, 
the employee will receive $300,000 of workers' compensation 
and $400,000 from the third party for a total of $700,000. But 
again, the $400,000 received by the employee from the third 
party is subject to the reimbursement right of the employer or 
its insurer.73 The net result is the employee receives only 
$400,000. 
B. The Duty of the Court is to Interpret the Statute 
in Light of Legislative Intent 
As this hypothetical demonstrates, whichever choice the 
court makes is unfair. If the employer is excluded from the 
apportionment process, the third party is liable for more than 
tiffs, defendants, or parties contributing to the injury of the employee, the jury 
must allocate 100% of the fault. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  879, 886. As a result, if a 
party which contributed to the injury of the employee is not included in the special 
verdict as provided for in section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Ad, the parties 
included in the special verdict will be responsible for the missing parties negligence 
since the jury must allocate 10W0 of the fault. The Utah Model Jury Instructions 
also provides for the allocation of 10Wo of the fault in this type of situation. MOD- 
EL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CML 36.2 (1993). 
68. $1,000,000 x 4Wo (the third-party's fault) = $400,000. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. 8 78-27-40 (1992) (defendant only liable for proportion of fault). 
69. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
70. See UTAH CODE ANN. 5 35-1-62 (1988); see also supra note 7 and accom- 
panying text; infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
71. This would be the result under pre-Liability Reform Act cases since under 
joint and several liability, the employer was not liable for contribution. See supra 
notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
72. See UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-27-40 (1992) (defendant only liable for propor- 
tion of fault). 
73. UTAH CODE ANN. !j 35-1-62 (1988); see supra note 7 and accompanying 
text; infia note 93 and accompanying text. 
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its actual proportional fault share. But if the employer is in- 
cluded, the combination of the inclusion of the employer's fault 
in the apportionment process and the reimbursement right of 
the employer or its insurer will severely diminish the net dam- 
age award of the injured employee. In short, the court must 
choose between two evils. 
Nevertheless, the court has a duty to interpret the statute 
as written by the Utah Legi~lature,?~ notwithstanding the de- 
cisions of other courts75 in other  jurisdiction^.^^ In this case, 
the court misinterpreted the intent of the legislature with re- 
spect to the apportionment of fault of an  immune employer. 
This misinterpretation can be seen from the plain language of 
the Liability Reform Act and the Act's legislative history. 
74. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1950); see also 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) (court's primary re- 
sponsibility is to "give effect to the intent of the legislature"); Parson Asphalt 
Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) ("over-arch- 
ing principle" is that statutes be "construed and applied in accordance with the 
intent of the Legislature"). 
75. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 
1984). In Jensen, the court concluded that while the Utah Legislature had adopted 
part of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act of 1973 from a similar Wisconsin 
rule, the Legislature did not intend to adopt the Wisconsin interpretation of the 
statute. Under Wisconsin law, the negligence of each individual defendant in a 
multiple defendant case is compared against the negligence of the plaintiff to de- 
termine liability. The court rejected this interpretation and concluded that the total 
negligence of all defendants should be compared to  the negligence of the plaintiff. 
But see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
76. While the court's reference to how other states apportion fault in employ- 
eelthird-party actions is helpful, the court fails to note significant differences in the 
employer's reimbursement right in some of those states. For example, in Kansas 
and New Mexico, the employer's recovery is diminished by the percentage of the 
employer's negligence. KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 44-504(d) (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 52-1- 
10.1 (Michie 1991); see infizt note 112. In Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, the 
employee receives a specific percentage of any damage award received from a third 
party regardless of the amount of compensation paid by the employer or insurer. 
OR. REV. STAT. 5 656.593 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 51.24.060 (West 1990); 
WYO. STAT. 8 27-14-105 (1991); see infh note 112. This information is significant 
because while some of these states apportion the employer's negligence, they tem- 
per the impact this would otherwise have on the employee's recovery by limiting in 
some way the employer's reimbursement. Thus, the result is less drastic than the 
result in Sullivan, in which the employer's negligence is apportioned and the em- 
ployer or its insurer still receives full reimbursement. 
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1. The plain language of the Liability Reform Act indicates 
immune employers are not to be included in the apportionment 
process 
The court in Sullivan stated "the best evidence of legisla- 
tive intent is the plain language of the statute."" Sections 78- 
27-38 and 78-27-39 contain the key language of the Liability 
Reform Act. Section 78-27-38 defines "comparative negligence": 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, 
no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant.78 
Section 78-27-39 contains the mechanism for determining and 
apportioning fault: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery and to each defendant." 
Based on these sections of the Liability Reform Act, in order for 
the fault of the employer to be determined and apportioned by 
the jury the employer must be at "fault" and be either a "per- 
son seeking recovery" or a "defendant." 
a. Employers are not at "fault." The Liability Reform Act 
defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or 
omission proximately causing or contributing t o  injury or dam- 
ages sustained by a person seeking recovery."80 Therefore, in 
order for the empioyer's negligence to be apportioned according 
to section 78-27-39, the employer's "fault" must be an "action- 
able breach of legal duty." 
When an employee suffers work-related injuries, the em- 
ployee automatically receives compensation from the employer 
or its insurers1 without a determination of the employer's 
77. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993); see also 
Jensen, 679 P.2d at 906 ("The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature in enacting [an act] is the plain language of the [a]&."). 
78. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-27-38 (1992) (emphasis added). 
79. Id. $ 78-27-39 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. $ 78-27-37(2). 
81. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee injured "by lanl acci- 
200 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
and is also expressly barred from bringing suit against 
the employer based on the employer's neg l igen~e .~~ In essence, 
the right of the employee to receive workers' compensation 
benefits is based not on the "fault" of the employer, but rather 
on the employee/employer relationship." Therefore, the im- 
mune employer's negligence, if any, is not a n  "actionable 
breach of legal duty" because the employee has no right to sue 
the employer.85 Based on these considerations, the court incor- 
rectly concluded that the jury may determine and apportion the 
"fault" of employers under the Liability Reform Act? 
b. Employers are not 'Ipersons seeking recovery." Section 
78-27-37(3) of the Liability Reform Act defines a "person seek- 
ing recovery" as "any person seeking damages or reim- 
bursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom 
it is authorized to act as legal repre~entative."~' Such a person 
is subject to the comparative negligence provision of the Liabili- 
ty Reform Act which states that a person seeking recovery 
"may [only] recover from any defendant or group of defendants 
whose fault exceeds his own."88 
Assuming, as did the court, that the employer may be 
viewed as a "person seeking recovery" because of the reim- 
dent arising out of and in the course of his employment, . . . shall be paid com- 
pensation for the loss sustained on account of the injury" by the employer or its 
insurer. Id. 8 35-1-45 (emphasis added). 
82. See HARPER, supra note 3, at  70; LARSON, supra note 3; see also Cudahy 
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 US. 418 (1923) (workers' compensation statutes im- 
pose liability regardless of act or omission by employer); Stokes v. Board of Re- 
view, 832 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah 1992) (proof of fault not required in workers' compen- 
sation cases); Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77, 85 (Utah 1938) (liability does not de- 
pend on the negligence of the employer); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 
P.2d 657, 658-5 9 (Utah 1937) ("[lo mpensation does not depend upon negligence"); 
Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (workers' 
compensation system "excludes consideration of fault"). 
83. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-60 (1988); see supm note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
84. Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1980); see also 
Cudahy Packing, 263 U.S. at  423 (liability based on relationship); M-K Rivers v. 
Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132, 134-35 (Alaska 1979) (liability based upon existence of 
employment relationship); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 272 (Cal. 
1981) (liability based on relationship). 
85. See supra note 6; see also Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 
886 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (immune parties negligence is not action- 
able). 
86. Sulliuan, 853 P.2d a t  884. 
87. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-27-37(3) (1992). 
88. Id. 8 78-27-38. 
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bursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Act:' the 
right of the employer or its insurer to reimbursement is then 
subject to the comparative negligence provision of the Liability 
Reform Act." Thus, under the court's reasoning, when an em- 
ployee injured a t  work sues a negligent third party, the em- 
ployer or its insurer cannot seek reimbursement unless the 
employer's fault is less than that of the third party." 
However, this reasoning contradicts the reimbursement 
right contained in the Workers7 Compensation Section 
35-1-62 of the Act provides that  "[ilf any recovery is obtained 
against [a] third person," the person liable for compensation 
payments "shall be reimbursed in full for all payments 
made.'7g3 This reimbursement right is not limited to when the 
fault of the employer is less than the fault of the third party.g4 
Therefore, the employer cannot be considered a "person 
seeking recovery" without limiting the reimbursement right of 
the employer or its insurer to situations in which the 
employer's fault is less than the fault of the third party. Such a 
89. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  881; see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
90. See Plaintiff Sullivan's Petition for Rehearing at 9-10, Sullivan (No. 
9 10482). 
91. See id. 
92. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988). 
93. Id. (emphasis added). The relevant portions of section 35-1-62 of the Utah 
Code provide as follows: 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be dis- 
bursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' 
fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties 
as their interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the em- 
ployer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the 
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents, for 
any recovery had against the third party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reim- 
bursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of 
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his 
heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any 
obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for compen- 
sation. 
Id. 
94. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  883 (The reimbursement right "is not reduced in 
any respect by the amount by which the employer's a d  or omission contributed to 
the employee's injuries."); see UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988) (This section does 
not restrict when the provider of the workers' compensation can seek reimburse- 
ment from a third party.). 
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definition would drastically alter the Workers' Compensation 
Act. It is unlikely this was the intent of the legislature. 
c. Employers are not "defendants. " Section 78-27-37(1) of 
the Liability Reform Act defines "defendant" as "any person not 
immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault 
to any person seeking recovery."g5 This definition contains two 
elements. First, a defendant cannot be a person that is immune 
from suit. Second, a defendant must be claimed to be liable 
because of fault.96 
As noted, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' 
Compensation Act grants the employer immunity from suit by 
an  employee accidentally injured at  work.g7 In  addition, the 
employer's liability does not arise from the employer's "fault," 
but rather because of the employer/employee relationship." 
Therefore, the employer is not a "defendant" under the Liabili- 
ty Reform Act. 
2. The legislative history of the Liability Reform Act shows 
the legislature did not intend immune employers to be included 
in the apportionment process 
Substitute Senate Bill No. 64, which ultimately became the 
Liability Reform Act:' initially provided in part: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to each other person 
whose fault contributed to the injury or damages.''' 
However, before enactment the italicized phrase was omitted 
and the word "and" was inserted before "to each defen- 
95. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-27-37(1) (1992) (emphasis added). 
96. See Reply Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth Sullivan at 6, Sullivan 
(No. 910482). 
97. See supra notes 6, 81-86 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
99. See 1986 Utah Laws 199. 
100. Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. $ 3 (1986) (emphasis added). A 
copy of this bill can be found in the Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth 
Sullivan at app. E, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
1871 SULLIVAN v. SCOULAR G U N  CO. 203 
dant."lO' The result is the present version of section 78-27- 
39.102 
The court in Sullivan essentially ignored the omission of 
this phrase as evidence of legislative intent.lo3 Instead, the 
court relied on a statement made by a senator during the floor 
debates concerning the bill and one part of the titlelq of the 
preliminary draft of the bill as evidence of legislative in- 
tent.lo5 As noted by the dissent, the court dismissed the omis- 
sion of this phrase "on the transparent ground that it is not 
clear why the language was deleted."lo6 
One possible reason for the omission of this phrase is that 
the Legislature wanted to  make clear that immune employers 
were not to be included in the apportionment process. If the 
phrase had been included in the bill, it could have caused con- 
fusion as to  whether employers should be included in the ap- 
portionment process. However, left out, both the omission of 
the phrase and the definitions of "fault," "person seeking recov- 
ery," and "defendant" provide a "compelling piece of legislative 
101. Amendment to Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. 5 3 (1986) (State & 
Local Standing Comm.). A copy of the letter containing the recommendations of the 
Committee can be found in the Brief of Certified Respondent K e ~ e t h  Sullivan a t  
app. F, Sullivan (No. 910482). 
102. The current version of section 78-27-39 of the Utah Code provides the 
following: 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct 
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total 
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-27-39 (1992). 
103. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  880. 
104. The full title of the preliminary draft of Senate Bill No. 64 states: 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; MODIFYING PROVI- 
SIONS RELATING TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFYING 
DUTIES OF JURORS AND JUDGES; ABOLISHING JOINT AND SEVER- 
AL LIABILITY AND RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG DEFEN- 
DANTS; REQUIRING FAULT OF DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED 
IN ONE TRIAL; AND DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS. 
Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. 5 3 (1986). A copy of this bill can be found 
in the Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth Sullivan at  app. E, Sullivan (No. 
9 104.82). 
105. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t  880. In K e ~ e c o t t  Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 
P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1973), the court stated that "it should be assumed that all of 
the words used in a statute were used advisedly and were intended to be given 
meaning and effect. For the same reasons, the omissions should likewise be taken 
note of and given effect." 
106. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at  886 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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history"'07 that the legislature did not intend the fault of an 
immune employer to  be included in the apportionment pro- 
~ess .~O~ 
C. A Possible Solution 
In response to  criticism by Justice Stewart in Su l l i~an , '~~  
Justice Durham stated in a later opinion that "[als the author 
of [Sullivan], I am not of the view that its result was necessari- 
ly 'good policy' . . . . I hope that the legislature will address the 
issue."'1° It is likely that the legislature will soon address the 
issue because of the court's conclusion in S~llivan."~ 
107. Id. 
108. Assuming the legislature did not intend the fault of the employer to be 
included in the apportionment process, a question arises as to the meaning of 
section 78-27-40 of the Liability Reform Act which provides that the "maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable . . . is that percentage or proportion 
of damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant." UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-27-40 (1992); see supra note 10. Recalling that 
the jury will apportion 100% of the fault among the parties on the special verdict 
as provided for in section 78-27-39, if the employer is not included on the special 
verdict the jury will simply apportion 100% of the fault among those parties on 
the special verdict. See supra notes 10 and 67. Therefore, the jury will apportion 
to some other party the negligence of the employer. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 886 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, while it is true some parties will pay more than 
their negligence would require if the employer were included on the special verdict, 
no party will pay more than the proportion of fault attributed to them by the jury. 
This result is unfair to the party which was apportioned the negligence of the 
employer, but this was the result intended by the legislature. See infia note 111. 
109. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
110. Brown v. Boyer-Washington Boulevard Ass'n, 856 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah 
1993) (Durham, J., concurring). 
111. Following the court's decision in Sullivan, the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah filed an amicus curiae brief in support of a petition for rehearing 
which was ultimately denied. Included within this brief were a number of &da- 
vits written by Utah senators and representatives in office when the Liability Re- 
form Act was passed. In general, these &davits state that the legislature did not 
intend to affect the workers' compensation system with the passage of the Liability 
Reform Act. Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae Brief in Sup- 
port of Petition for Rehearing at app. 7, 9, Sullivan (No. 910482). Additionally, for- 
mer Senator Paul Rogers, a sponsor of the Liability Reform Act, stated: 
I have read the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in [Sullivan]. The 
majority opinion therein determined a legislative intent contrary to my 
intent as a sponsor of the legislation and contrary to the intent of the 
Legislature. It was never the intent of the Legislature for the injured 
employee to bear the burden of the employer's conduct alone by having 
the third-party damages reduced by the employer's proportionate "fault" 
and then requiring the injured worker to reimburse the employer the full 
amount of the subrogation allowed by Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. of the Work- 
ers Compensation Act of Utah. Rather, the amendments which became a 
part of the Act were designed to make it clear that the employer's con- 
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One possible legislative solution is to allow the fault of the 
immune employer to be determined and apportioned, but to 
permit the employer or its insurer to be reimbursed only for 
the amount paid in workers' compensation benefits that ex- 
ceeds the employer's proportional fault share.'12 Such a solu- 
tion would require the alteration of both the Liability Reform 
Act and the Workers' Compensation Act. 
With respect to the Liability Reform Act, the legislature 
would need to alter the definition of "fault" as well as the ap- 
portionment provisions of the Act. If the word "actionable" were 
removed from the definition of "fault" in section 78-27- 
37(2),'13 and the excluded portions of section 78-27-39 of Sen- 
ate Bill No. 64 were reinserted into the Act,'" the Liability 
Reform Act would then legitimately do what the Sullivan court 
did and allow for the determination and apportionment of the 
immune employer's fault. 115 
duct was not to be compared to that of the injured employee and the 
defendantts) in a civil lawsuit. The employer's responsibility for all their 
injured employees was provided for by their participation in the no-fault 
workers compensation system. 
Id. at app. 8 (emphasis omitted); see GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at  
18-19 (recommending the legislature address the "potentially adverse effects of the 
Sullivan decision."). 
112. Kansas and New Mexico have similar types of statutes. In Kansas, "the 
employer's subrogation interest or credits against future payments of compensation 
. . . shall be diminished by the percentage of the damage award attributed to the 
negligence of the employer." KAN. STAT. ANN. $ 44-504(d) (1986). In New Mexico, 
"the employer's right t o  reimbursement from the proceeds of the worker's recovery 
in any action against any wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of 
fault, if any, attributed to the employer." N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 52-1-10.1 (Michie 
1991). In Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, the employee receives a specific per- 
centage of any damage award received from a third party regardless of the amount 
of compensation paid by the employer or insurer. OR. REV. STAT. $ 656.593 (1991) 
(employee gets at least one-third of the balance of the recovery); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. $ 51.24.060 (West 1990) (employee gets at  least twenty-five percent of the 
balance of the award); WYO. STAT. $ 27-14-105 (1991) (employee gets at least two- 
thirds of the total proceeds). 
113. Section 78-27-37(2) would read as a follows: 
"Fault" means any w&km&e breach of legal duty, ad, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all its 
degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach 
of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and mis- 
use, modification or abuse of a product. 
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
115. In addition to allowing for the determination and apportionment of fault 
of immune employers, these alterations of the Liability Reform Act would also 
permit the determination and apportionment of fault of other previously immune 
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Concerning the Workers' Compensation Act, the legislature 
would need to modify the reimbursement provision. This would 
require that  subsection (2) of section 35-1-62'16 be replaced 
with a provision such as follows: 
The person liable for compensation payments shall be 
reimbursed for all payments made in excess of the employer's 
proportional fault, less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorney's fees provided for in Subsection ( l ) . l 1 7  
The advantage of this proposal is that third-parties would 
be liable only for their proportional fault share, yet the 
employee's recovery from the third party would not be 
disproportionately reduced by both the inclusion of the 
employer's fault in the apportionment process and by the reim- 
bursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. A hy- 
pothetical will best illustrate these principles. 
Assume an employee is injured a t  work as a result of the 
negligence of the employer and a third party. A jury would find 
that  the employer is twenty percent a t  fault, the third party 
eighty percent a t  fault, and that the employee, who was not a t  
all at fault, sustained $1,000,000 in damages.'" Under the 
Workers' Compensation Act, the employee receives $300,000 
from the employer or its insurer. The employee then brings suit 
against the third party. 
Assume further that the legislature has enacted the previ- 
ously mentioned  proposal^"^ and that the fault of the em- 
ployer is determined and apportioned. Thus, the third party is 
liable for $800,000, which represents its eighty percent propor- 
tional fault share under the Liability Reform Act, and the em- 
ployer or its insurer is liable for the $300,000 based on the 
parties. The legislature would have to determine whether these alterations sweep 
too broadly and therefore require some limitations. 
116. See supra note 93. 
117. In addition to this provision, the Workers' Compensation Act would need 
to provide that the employer be included in, or agree to, any employeelthird-party 
settlement. The purpose for this provision is to avoid litigation after an employ- 
eelthird-party settlement to determine the amount of reimbursement to which the 
employer is entitled. Including the employer in any settlement agreement allows 
the employer to  protect its reimbursement interest and make necessary provisions 
for reimbursement at  the time of the settlement. See HAW. REV. STAT. 5 386-8 
(1985) (settlement requires written consent of both employer and employee); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 656.587 (1991) ("written approval of paying agency or, in the event of 
a dispute between the parties by order of the board"). 
118. See supra note 62. 
119. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text. 
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Workers' Compensation Act. The employee receives a total of 
$1,100,000. 
However, the $800,000 paid by the third to  the em- 
ployee is subject to the reimbursement right of the employer or 
its insurer.120 But the reimbursement right only allows reim- 
bursement for the amount paid by the employer or its insurer 
in excess of the employer's proportional fault share.l2l In this 
case, since the employer was twenty percent at fault, the em- 
ployer's proportional fault share is $200,000. Therefore, the em- 
ployer or its insurer can seek reimbursement only for the 
amount of compensation paid above $200,000. In this case, the 
employer or its insurer is reimbursed by the employee for 
$100,000. 
The result is that the third party is liable for $800,000, 
which represents its eighty percent proportional fault share 
under the Liability Reform Act; the employer or its insurer is 
liable for $300,000 under the Workers' Compensation Act, but 
can seek $100,000 in reimbursement from the $800,000 re- 
ceived by the employee from the third party; and the employee 
receives $1,000,000 in total compensation ($800,000 from the 
third party and $300,000 in workers' compensation, minus 
$100,000 in reimbursement to the employer or its insurer). As 
can be seen, this proposal more fairly allocates the fault of the 
parties. 
In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain CO.,'~~ the Utah Supreme 
Court misinterpreted the intent of the legislature with respect 
to the apportionment of fault of employers in an employ- 
eehhird-party suit. The court's error can be seen in both the 
plain language of the Liability Reform Act and in the Act's 
legislative history. As a result of the court's decision, an 
employee's recovery from a negligent third party will be signifi- 
cantly reduced because of the inclusion of the employer's fault 
in the apportionment process and the reimbursement right of 
the employer or its insurer. 
Because of the Sullivan decision, the legislature should act 
to correct the court's error. The best solution is to amend both 
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
121. Id. 
122. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993). 
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the Liability Reform Act and the Workers' Compensation Act to 
allow for the determination and apportionment of the 
employer's fault, but to limit the reimbursement right of the 
employer or its insurer to the amount paid in excess of the 
employer's proportional fault share. By so doing, the legislature 
would more fairly allocate the fault of employers, employees, 
and third-p arties. 123 
Dale T. Hansen 
123. Shortly before publication of thise Note, the Utah Legislature altered the 
method of recovery and reimbursement in employeelthird-party suits. In essence, 
the Legislature provided that the employer's fault in employeelthird-party suits will 
always be apportioned by the jury. If the jury determines that the employer's fault 
is less than 40%, the trial court will reallocate the employer's fault among the 
other parties in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to each party. 
However, if the employer's fault is determined to be equal to or greater than 40%, 
the employer's fault will be included in the apportionment process, but it will also 
be used to reduce the employer's reimbursement by the percentage of the 
employer's fault. Telephone Conversation with D e ~ i s  V. Lloyd, Vice President and 
General Counsel for the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (Mar. 9, 1994); see 
Substitute S. 224, Gen. Sess. (1994); Top Business Issues in 1994 Session, UTAH 
MANUFACTURERS ASS% BULL., Mar. 1994, at 1. 
